


















In this paper I address two questions. First, is the fall in the cyclical volatility of U.S. 
commercial banking productivity a potential candidate to account for the mid-80's fall 
in U.S. business cycle volatility? Second, does the answer to the previous question 
change under the presence of financial frictions? The answer to the first question is that 
the fall in the cyclical volatility of banking productivity contributes significantly only to 
the volatility fall of the credit cycle. The answer to the second question is that allowing 
for financial acceleration does not change the results significantly. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to answer two questions. First, is the fall in the cycli-
cal volatility of U.S. commercial banking productivity a potential candidate to account
for the mid-80's fall in U.S. business cycle volatility? Second, does the answer to the
previous question change under the presence of ¯nancial frictions? To answer these
questions I construct and calibrate to U.S. post-Korean war data a general equilib-
rium business cycle model with costly ¯nancial intermediation and (optional) credit
multipliers a-la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kocherlakota (2000). The model is
developed in Arias (2002).
The main ¯nding is that the fall in the cyclical volatility of banking productivity
contributes signi¯cantly only to the credit cycle volatility fall. For the other macroeco-
nomic aggregates, the contribution lies between 2 and 5 percentage points of volatility
reduction (out of 50). I also ¯nd that allowing for ¯nancial acceleration does not
change the previous results signi¯cantly if parameter values still replicate basic, em-
pirical, macroeconomic regularities observed in the US during the post-Korean war
period. According to the results, ¯nancial acceleration only augments the contribution
of the fall in the cyclical volatility of banking productivity to the credit cycle volatility
fall. In short, this paper adds even more skepticism to the quantitative importance
of ¯nancial frictions as propagation and ampli¯cation mechanisms for macroeconomic
shocks.
How should productivity °uctuations in the banking system be interpreted? Most
of the empirical evidence documenting productivity °uctuations in the ¯nancial sector
of the U.S. and of other countries identi¯es two elements as the main driving forces
of the observed movements in ¯nancial productivity. The ¯rst one has to do with
changes in banking regulation. A deregulatory process increases competitive forces
in the ¯nancial system so that \banks not allocating their resources e±ciently would
perish unless they could become more like their e±cient competitors by producing more
output with existing inputs" (Alam 2001, pp. 122). 1
This link between banking regulation and productivity adds more relevance to this
paper given the major deregulatory process experienced by the U.S. banking industry
in the early 80's.2 If any link can be established between the mid-80's U.S. business
cycle volatility fall and the contemporaneous volatility fall of U.S. commercial banking
productivity, many avenues for future research will open up focusing, especially, on the
1However, it is important to highlight that the empirical literature contains results
that do not always ¯t the conventional channel connecting tighter regulatory con-
straints and lower banking productivity growth. See Arias (2001) for a survey of the
results and the state of the discussion.
2The Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and
the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 were the main building blocks of this process. The
phasing out of regulation Q also began in 1980 and was ¯nally achieved in 1986.
2impact of banking regulation over business cycle volatility. This is a ¯eld that has not
been explored yet.
Furthermore, when choosing the optimal banking regulatory levels, policymakers
face a trade-o®. More regulation probably alleviates moral hazard and asymmetric
information problems that cause overinvestment and lending boom syndromes of the
type that end with ¯nancial crashes and credit crunches.3 On the other hand, more
banking regulation hinders the versatility of ¯nancial intermediaries' operations, slows
down the natural competitive forces of the banking arena and, hence, reduces the pro-
ductivity of the ¯nancial sector. By shedding some light on the macroeconomic impact
of productivity °uctuations in the banking sector and on the corresponding transmis-
sion mechanism, with and without ¯nancial frictions, this paper also contributes to a
better understanding of the trade-o® associated to more banking regulation.
The second main cause of °uctuations in the productivity of ¯nancial intermediaries
is technological change. Indeed, the increased availability of new ¯nancial instruments
and advances in information-processing technologies enhance the productivity of banks
and other ¯nancial intermediaries by reducing the volume of real resources used up in
project selection, intermediation and monitoring processes. It is not surprising that
today, with the new information technologies, bankers are able to evaluate projects
faster than 30 years ago. Indeed, it has been estimated that investment in technology
by U.S. commercial banks rose from 5.5 billion dollars in 1982 to 13 billion dollars in
1991.4
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the theoretical model is
presented. Section 3 discusses the calibration procedure. Sections 4 presents some
stylized facts while section 5 reveals the results of the experiment that was carried out
to answer the question that motivates this paper. The last section concludes.
2 MODEL
In each period the economy is inhabited by a large number (N) of identical, in¯nitely-
lived, risk-averse households that discount the future at rate 1=¯ ¡ 1. Population
grows at rate ´ and the initial population level is normalized to 1 [Nt = (1 + ´)t].
Each household is endowed with one unit of time which can be allocated to leisure
or to labor. Labor is indivisible like in Hansen (1985). The shift length is ¯xed at
h < 1 units of time and the household sends a fraction n of its members to work while
the remaining fraction (1 ¡ n) does not work at all. Households have log utility in
3See Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1996), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1997), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, 1999), Kaminsky (1999)
and Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2000)
4The Economist, Oct. 3, 1992, pp. 21-24. [Reference taken from Tirtiroglu, Daniels
and Tirtiroglu (1998)]
3consumption (c) and leisure:
U = log(c) + nlog(1 ¡ h) (2.1)
Households supply their labor services to a competitive market at wage w. Each
household also owns capital (k) and land (l), which it can rent out in competitive
markets at rental rates r and s, respectively. The ¯nal good of this economy, which
is the numeraire, can be consumed (c) or accumulated as additional capital (k) by
each household. Land, on the other hand, is a di®erent good and its total supply is
equal to the population level. Hence, land supply is ¯xed at 1 at the per capita level.
To purchase an additional unit of land a household must pay q. The stock of capital
depreciates at rate ± and the stock of land does not depreciate.
Besides households, two other actors play a role in this economy: a ¯rm and a
bank. The ¯rm produces ¯nal output using labor, capital, land and the bank's output
as inputs to a constant returns to scale (crs) technology. Note then that the bank's
output is simply an intermediate input to the ¯nal good producing ¯rm. To produce
this intermediate input the bank combines deposits and labor in another crs production
function. Let the relative price of the bank's output be denoted as (1+½). Given that
the bank's output has the interpretation of an intra-temporal loan, (1 + ½) has the
interpretation of an intra-temporal, gross, loan rate. Deposits come from abroad at
exogenous, intra-temporal, gross rate (1 + R). Note that the bank plays no role in
transferring purchasing power across periods. Households can do this internally by
accumulating capital or by purchasing land.
Finally, it is assumed that the ¯nal good producing ¯rm and the bank are subject to
stochastic, AR(1), productivity shocks z and x, respectively, and that they also exhibit
deterministic, labor augmenting, technological progress at rates u and v, respectively.
This distinguishes continuous, permanent, technological improvement (e.g. discovery
of a new technology) from random, temporary, productivity shocks (e.g. regulatory
changes). This also allows the model to exhibit a constant loan-deposit interest rate
spread while the bank enjoys continuous productivity improvement.
The economy exhibits a balanced growth path along which the per-capita capital
stock, per-capita consumption, per-capita ¯nal good output, per-capita deposits, the
wage and the rental rate of land grow at a constant rate while per-capita landholdings,
the employment rate and the rental rate of capital remain constant. The balanced
growth path of the economy will be studied here.
2.1 Household
Let e ¯ = ¯(1 + ´). The following sequential problem for one household can be mapped
into a social planning problem for the aggregate economy if the utility of each household
is weighted equally by the planner:
4Maxfct; kt+1; lt+1; ntg E0
P1
t=0 e ¯t [log(ct) + nt log(1 ¡ h)]
s:t:
ct + (1 + ´)kt+1 + qtlt+1 = wtnth + [rt + (1 ¡ ±)]kt + (st + qt)lt
qt; wt; rt; st; given
k0; l0 = 1 given
where c, k, l, and n represent the household's stock of capital, consumption level,
stock of land and employment rate, respectively.
2.2 Final Good Producing Firm
In this economy the ¯nal good producing ¯rm uses a Cobb-Douglas technology in four
inputs of production: labor, capital, land and credit. Let kd, n1, bd and ld represent the
per-capita volume of capital services, employees, credit and land services demanded by




















log(zt+1) = ½0 + ½1 log(zt) + "t+1; "t v N(0;¾
2
") (2.3)
The loans-in-the production function assumption articulates the credit channel of
the economy. The motivation for this loan-in-the-production function assumption is
that ¯rms usually need to pay for some intermediate inputs (or labor services) in
advance of production and must rely on liquid funds provided by banks to do so.
Without these liquid external funds, ¯rms cannot operate their technologies. In this
sense, loans can be understood as a di®erent input of production. Moreover, a model
with a loans-in-the production function assumption is isomorphic to a model with a
cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on the intermediate input bill or wage bill of the ¯nal
good producing ¯rm (see Arias 2002). At the end of the day both treatments highlight
the role of liquidity or working capital provided by ¯nancial intermediaries as essential
to production processes. Due to its simplicity, the loans-in-the production function
assumption is used hereafter to articulate a credit channel in the economy.
2.3 Bank
In order to study the macroeconomic impact of productivity °uctuations in ¯nancial
intermediation, the model must employ an appropriate representation of the banking
technology through which resources are intermediated. The model suggested here em-
ploys a technological speci¯cation for banks that follows the \intermediation approach"
5of Sealey and Lindley (1977). Under this approach all deposits and funds borrowed
from ¯nancial markets are considered inputs of production (Freixas and Rochet 1998).5
Consider a setup where banks behave competitively and are price takers. Banks
combine deposits and labor in a Cobb Douglas technology to produce the intra-period
safe loans that the ¯nal good producing ¯rm requires each period.6 Let dt and n2
represent the per-capita volume of deposits and employees demanded by the bank.







log(xt+1) = '0 + '1 log(xt) + Àt+1; Àt v N(0;¾
2
À) (2.5)
The ¯nancial intermediation technology is costly and similar to the one used by
Cole and Ohanian (2000). In fact, wn2h > 0 captures all the resources used in the
intermediation process. This formalizes the idea that in order to intermediate deposits
into loans, banks must carry out a variety of costly activities like evaluating creditors,
managing deposits, renting buildings, maintaining ATMs, etc. (Edwards and Vegh
1997). Note also that with crs in the intermediation technology it is possible to assume
an atomistic structure in the banking industry. This assumption is also consistent with
the fact that ¯rms of many sizes coexist in the ¯nancial sector.
2.4 Credit Constraint
To articulate a ¯nancial acceleration mechanism a credit constraint will be introduced.
5The idea behind this approach is that all liabilities in the bank's balance sheet
(core deposits and purchased funds) plus ¯nancial equity capital provide funds and are
considered to be inputs since they generate costs [Berger and Mester (2001)]. On the
other hand, all assets (loans and investments outstanding) use bank funds to generate
revenues and are considered outputs [Freixas and Rochet (1998)]. Note that following
this approach implies interpreting depositor services as payments to ¯nancial inputs
that do not receive interest remuneration (like demand deposits) [see Berger and Mester
(2001) pp. 16]. Alternative approaches are the \production approach" and the \user
cost approach" which treat depositor services as part of a ¯nancial intermediary's ¯nal
output [e.g.: Tirtiroglu, Daniels and Tirtiroglu (1998)]
6Actually, any crs technology in the banking sector can be used. In fact, alternative
functional forms for the bank's production function like Leontief or Leontief with ad-
justment costs in employment were also studied (adjustment costs capture the idea that
banks pay certain cost when they change their employees due to speci¯c information or
knowledge that the employees have about the bank's clients). Here the Cobb-Douglas
case is presented due to its analytical tractability.
6To introduce a credit constraint into the model an environment like the one in Kocher-
lakota (2000) will be assumed. Suppose the bank is owned by the international depos-
itors. Funding the ¯rm's working capital is risky for the bank. The reason is that at
the end of every period the owner of the ¯rm -the household- can run away with the
proceeds from the ¯rm plus a fraction » 2 [0;1] of his/her total assets (i.e. land plus
the undepreciated stock of capital), without paying back the loan to the bank. Assume
also that default is not penalized with market exclusion. The bank is aware of the risk
involved in lending to the ¯rm. As a result, the bank takes care not to let the ¯rm
borrow beyond the amount that would make it worth while for the owner to run away
without repaying the loan:
b
d 6
(1 ¡ »)[qld + (1 ¡ ±)kd]
(1 + ½)
(2.6)
Under the previous constraint it is optimal for the ¯rm never to default in equi-
librium. In other words, in order to eliminate the risk of default, the bank imposes a
natural credit constraint on the ¯rm: the outstanding value of the ¯rm's debt at the end
of the period [(1+½)bd] can never exceed the value of the owner's seizable/collateralizable
resources at the end of the period
¡
(1 ¡ »)[qld + (1 ¡ ±)kd]
¢
. As in other credit limit
models, borrowing is so tightly constrained by the volume of collateral that default
never occurs in equilibrium. Note also that the credit constraint is a decreasing func-
tion of the gross loan rate. This captures the idea that any rise in the interest rate melts
down collateral by reducing the volume of principal associated to any given volume of
outstanding debt at the end of the period.
2.5 Balanced Growth Path
Along the balanced growth path of the economy the per-capita stock of capital, per-
capita consumption, per-capita ¯nal good output, per-capita deposits, the wage and
the rental rate of land grow at the same rate. Let g be this rate. On the other hand,
employment allocated to each sector (i.e. bank and ¯rm), the per-capita stock of land







To simplify notation, from now on all variables (which are already in per-capita
terms) are also in growth-detrended terms.
2.6 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The aggregate state of the economy is given by the two stochastic shocks and the
7aggregate stock of capital: (z;x;K). At an individual level, the state is given by the
individual capital stock and individual landholdings (k;l). The following de¯nitions
formalize the recursive competitive equilibrium of the per-capita economy along its
balanced growth path, in terms of growth-detrended variables.
De¯nition 2.1. P1 is the following dynamic programming problem for the household:
V (z;x;K;k;l) = Maxk0;l0;nflog[w(z;x;K)nh + [r(z;x;K) + (1 ¡ ±)]k+
[s(z;x;K) + q(z;x;K)]l ¡ (1 + ´)(1 + g)k0
¡q(z;x;K)l0] + nlog(1 ¡ h) + e ¯EV (z0;x0;K0;k0;l0)g
s:t:
K0 = H(z;x;K)
log(z0) = ½0 + ½1 log(z) + "0; "0 v N(0;¾2
")
log(x0) = '0 + '1 log(x) + À0; À0 v N(0;¾2
À)
cov(";À) = 0
De¯nition 2.2. If there are no credit constraints, P2 is the following static problem
for the ¯nal good producing ¯rm:








If there is a credit constraint, P2 is the following static problem for the ¯nal good
producing ¯rm:











De¯nition 2.3. P3 is the following static problem for the bank:
Maxfn2;dg [1 + ½(z;x;K)]b ¡ (1 + R)d ¡ w(z;x;K)n2h
s:t:
b = xdµ(n2h)1¡µ
De¯nition 2.4. A recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE) is
1. A value function: V (z;x;K;k;l).
2. A set of individual decision rules: k0(z;x;K;k;l); l0(z;x;K;k;l) and n(z; x; K;
k; l).
3. A set of demands by the ¯nal good producing ¯rm: kd(z;x;K); n1(z;x;K);
bd(z;x;K) and ld(z;x;K).
84. A set of demands by the bank: d(z;x;K) and n2(z;x;K)
5. A set of pricing functions: w(z;x;K);r(z;x;K);s(z;x;K);q(z;x;K) and ½(z;x;K).
6. An aggregate decision rule: H(z;x;K).
such that:
² Given (5) and (6), (1) and (2) solve (P1).
² Given (5), (3) solves (P2).
² Given (5), (4) solves (P3).
² Markets clear:
1. n1(z;x;K) + n2(z;x;K) = n(z;x;K;K;1)
2. kd(z;x;K) = K
3. ld(z;x;K) = 1
4. l0(z;x;K;K;1) = 1
5. bd(z;x;K) = b(z;x;K) = xd(z;x;K)µ [n2(z;x;K)h]
1¡µ
² Aggregate Consistency: k0(z;x;K;K;1) = H(z;x;K).
2.7 Financial Accelerator
The credit constrained economy displays a ¯nancial accelerator that can be decomposed
into a static and a dynamic credit multiplier (see Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). Under
this speci¯cation the economy takes longer to converge back to the steady state than
in a ¯nancially frictionless setup.
3 CALIBRATION
Parameters were calibrated to a quarterly frequency using U.S. data for the period
1959-1999 (see calibration appendix). Speci¯cally, parameter values were chosen so
that the model (with and without a binding credit constraint), in stationary state,
replicates the following 1959-1999 averages observed in the U.S.:
The following tables illustrate the calibrated parameter values if the credit con-
straint is left out (see calibration appendix):
The following tables illustrate the calibrated parameter values when the credit
constraint is introduced and binds (see calibration appendix). These are the parameter
9Table 1:
c/y i/y d/y k/y n n1 n2
0.5914 0.3422 0.0661 10.1740 0.9399 0.9299 0.01
Table 2:
labor share land share capital share deposit share
0.5394 0.0130 0.3811 0.0664
values of the model if it were true that the productive apparatus of the U.S. economy
has faced credit constraints during the 1959-1999 period:
Except for ® and Á, all parameters keep the same value under both setups. The
reason for the di®erence in the calibrated values of ® and Á is that, when there is a
binding credit constraint, it can be shown that:
(1 + ½)b
d < Áy (3.1)
rk
d + sl
d > ®y + (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)y (3.2)
w(n1h) = °y (3.3)
which means that the share of credit in output falls short of its natural share Á while
the shares of capital and land in output exceed their natural shares ® and (1¡®¡°¡Á).
These are natural results. With a binding credit constraint the ¯rm cannot equate the
marginal productivity of credit to the loan rate (or marginal cost of credit). Instead,
the ¯rm has to produce where the former exceeds the latter. This implies that the share
of credit in output has to lie below its natural share Á. On the other hand, under a
credit constrained environment land and capital contribute to output not only directly
as inputs of production, but also indirectly due to their collateral properties (more land
and capital imply more collateral, more loans and, consequently, more output). This
implies that the shares of capital and land in output must exceed their natural shares
® and (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á). Note, however, that labor share in the ¯nal good producing
¯rm is still ° and that the zero pro¯t condition still holds.
In consequence, with a binding credit constraint the calibrated values for ® =
0:375 and (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á) = 0:0110 must fall short of the capital and land shares
measured in the data and replicated by the model (0:3811 and 0:0130). Additionally,
the calibrated values for Áµ = 0:0736 and ° + Á(1 ¡ µ) = 0:5401 must lie above the
10Table 3:
¯ ± ® ° Á µ h
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11deposit and labor shares measured in the data and replicated by the model (0:0664 and
0:5394). Given that the calibrated values for µ and ° do not change with respect to
the ¯nancially frictionless economy, the previous condition implies that, in the credit
constrained economy, the calibrated value for Á must exceed the value calibrated for
the unconstrained economy.
Overall, the calibration seems reasonable except for two features. First, the model's
share of commercial banks in output is high (7.2%) considering that the gross product
attributed to commercial banking activities as a percentage of total GDP has °uctuated
between 1.1% and 2.7% between 1947 and 1987.7 However, the model replicates with
exactitude the share of deposits in income (6:64%). The second uncomfortable result
of the calibration is that the fraction of time that agents spend in market activities
(nh = 0:58) is high considering that this number has been estimated to be around 0.31.
An alternative would be to calibrate the model so that it replicates this number. The
problem with this calibration procedure is that it would not replicate exactly labor's
share or land's share of output.
The steady state of the model implies that ql=y = 3:4430 and b=y = 0:0519. These
ratios were not targeted with the calibration strategy. According to land market value
data from the discontinued C.9 release of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the
average land to output ratio was 0:3531 during the period 1959 ¡ 1994. According
to data on commercial and industrial loans from commercial banks the average loans
to output ratio is 0:0801 for the period 1959 ¡ 1999. Note then that the model does
not replicate the land to output ratio and the loans to output ratio observed in the
data. The mismatch is especially severe in the land to output ratio. However, land
market value data is not very reliable; in fact, it is discontinued. Moreover, this data
is not needed for the calibration strategy. Now, the data-model mismatch of the loans
to output ratio is not too serious considering that the model still replicates accurately
the observed deposit to output ratio. Recall that deposits are, ultimately, the relevant
intermediate ¯nancial input into ¯nal good production.8
Now, recall the parameters of the stochastic processes governing log(z) and log(x):
log(zt+1) = ½0 + ½1 log(zt) + "t+1; "t v N(0;¾
2
") (3.4)
7Source: Dept. of Commerce, BEA. Data for the period 1987-2001 is only available
for the aggregate of all depository institutions. Between 1987 and 2001 the gross
product of all depository institutions as a percentage of total GDP has °uctuated
between 2.8% and 3.7%:
8An alternative calibration strategy is to target the observed b=y instead of the
observed d=y. Following such strategy requires the use of loan interest rate data while
targeting the deposit to output ratio requires the use of deposit interest rate data.
Given the heterogeneity implicit in the di®erent loan interest rate series available, the
choice of a representative or average loan interest rate is a di±cult choice that can be
avoided by choosing to target d=y instead of b=y.
12Table 7:
b ½0 b ½1 b ¾" c '0 c '1 c 'º
0.0153 0.9981 0.0069 -0.0262 0.9728 0.0160
log(xt+1) = '0 + '1 log(xt) + Àt+1; Àt v N(0;¾
2
À) (3.5)
The way in which z and x can be constructed from data is detailed in the shock
identi¯cation appendix. U.S. quarterly data was used to construct series for z and x.
The parameters of the AR(1) processes governing log(z) and log(x) were estimated with
simple ordinary least squares techniques. The resulting estimates depend on whether
data for deposits is used or not (see shock identi¯cation appendix). The following
table reports the results of the estimation using the complete data set (i.e. including
deposits) for the period 1959 ¡ 1999. Recall that this is the period to which the other
parameters of the model were calibrated.9
Once the parameters of the model (¯;±;®;°; Á;µ;h;g;´;R;») are calibrated and
once the parameters of the stochastic processes governing log(z) and log(x) (½0;½1;¾";'0;
'1;¾À;¾"À) are estimated, the recursive competitive equilibrium is solved with the
linear-quadratic method (see Cooley and Hansen 1995 or Ljunqvist and Sargent 2000,
chapter 4). See the solution appendix for a check on the accuracy and robustness of
the solution method.
4 STYLIZED FACTS
Commercial banking productivity has been more volatile than productivity in the rest
of the economy during the last decades. This fact is robust to di®erent de¯nitions
and measures of productivity. The ¯rst four columns of the following table present
the ratio between the standard deviation of the HP cyclical component of output per
hour in commercial banks and the standard deviation of the HP cyclical component
of four di®erent output per hour measures for the rest of the economy, using BLS
data.10 The last two columns compare the volatility of the noise of the AR(1) process
9The estimates do not change signi¯cantly when deposits are removed from the data
set to construct z and x (see shock identi¯cation appendix).
10Output per hour in U.S. commercial banks is series yf=n in the productivity mea-
surement appendix. Output per hour in the rest of the U.S.economy is series yi=n









s.e(y4=n)cyc ( c ¾º
c ¾")1 ( c ¾º
c ¾")2
3.73 2.32 2.32 1.74 2.33 2.61
governing log(TFP) in commercial banks (i.e. ¾À) to the volatility of the noise of the
AR(1) process governing log(TFP) in non-¯nancial sectors (i.e. ¾"), using the TFP
de¯nitions in the theoretical model suggested above. Speci¯cally, column 5 reports
the ratio between the estimated ¾À and the estimated ¾" when deposit data is used to
construct z and x while column 6 reports the same numbers when no deposit data is
used to construct z and x11. The table shows that commercial banking productivity is
between 1.75 and 3.75 times more volatile than productivity in the non-banking sectors
of the economy.
In the theoretical model suggested here the volatility of the Solow residual depends
critically on the volatility of both banking and non-banking TFP (x and z). Hence,
studying the evolution of the volatility of banking TFP shocks (and of TFP shocks in
the rest of the economy) is of crucial importance given the results of Arias, Hansen and
Ohanian (2002). These authors document a 40%-60% fall in the volatility of the U.S.
business cycle in 198412 and ¯nd that any explanation of this fall must also account
for a 50% fall in the volatility of the Solow residual. They also ¯nd that the standard
RBC model does a good job in reconciling these facts.
5 EXPERIMENT
After observing the stylized facts documented in the previous section, a natural ques-
tion arises. Is banking productivity a potential contributor to the observed fall in the
volatility of the U.S. business cycle? Or is it the other way around? The experiment
conducted in this section aims at answering the previous question. The idea is to disen-
tangle the contribution of banking and non-¯nancial productivity shocks (i.e. x and z)
to a fall in business cycle volatility. The ¯rst step of the experiment is to measure the
volatility reduction of both shocks after 1984. To do so, the AR(1) processes governing
log(x) and log(z) are estimated with data prior to 1984 and with data starting in 1984.
The results depend on whether deposit data is used or not in the construction of x and
lated with a smoothing parameter value of 400. The same time interval (1967-1999)
was used for all series in the application of the HP ¯lter.
11See shock identi¯cation appendix.
12See also McConnell, Mosser and Perez Quiros (1999), Kahn, McConnell and Perez
Quiros (2000), McConnell and Perez Quiros (2000)
14Table 9:
b ½0 b ½1 b ¾" c '0 c '1 c 'º
c ¾"
c ¾º
59.I-83.IV 0.0470 0.9919 0.0081 -0.0240 0.9742 0.0175 2.16
84.I-99.IV -0.0154 1.0037 0.0042 -0.0175 0.9827 0.0134 3.19
z. The following table reports the resulting estimates using the complete data set (i.e.
including deposits) which are the ones used in the experiment.13 Note that, for both
subsamples, the estimated volatility gap between the banking productivity shock and





is consistent with the volatility gap reported
above for the whole sample (i.e. between 1.75 and 3.75).
The next step of the experiment is to compare the volatility of the economy's
business cycle under two di®erent sets of simulations, each representing either the
1959 ¡ 1983 or the 1984 ¡ 1999 subsample. Precisely, 200 periods (i.e. quarters)
of the arti¯cial economy are simulated 100 times using decision rules obtained un-
der parameter values calibrated for the whole sample (1959 ¡ 1999) but estimates of
(½0;½1;¾";'0;'1;¾À) for the 1959:I¡1983:IV subsample. In each simulation the initial
state of the economy is set at its non-stochastic, stationary value and the ¯rst 100 peri-
ods of each simulation are discarded. At the end of the day each simulation represents
the U.S. economy during the 25 years (or 100 periods) of the pre-1984 subsample (i.e.
1959-1983). Next, 164 periods of the economy are simulated 100 times using decision
rules obtained under parameter values calibrated for the whole sample (1959 ¡ 1999)
but estimates of (½0;½1;¾";'0;'1;¾À) for the 1984:I ¡ 1999:IV subsample.14. Again,
in each simulation the initial state of the economy is set at its non-stochastic, sta-
tionary value and the ¯rst 100 periods of each simulation are discarded. Thus, each
of these simulations represents the U.S. economy during the 16 years (or 64 periods)
corresponding to the post-1984 subsample (i.e. 1984-1999).
Traditional business cycle statistics are computed with each set of simulations. A
comparison of these statistics across both sets of simulations should reveal the joint
contribution of the fall in ¾À and ¾" to the total fall in business cycle volatility. The
following tables report, for both sets of simulations, the mean (across all 100 simula-
tions) of the standard deviation of the cyclical component of output (y), consumption
13The estimates do not change signi¯cantly when deposits are removed from the data
set to construct x and z.
14Note that the estimate of ½1 from subsample 1984.I-1999.IV is greater than one.This
estimate cannot be used given that the model requires a stationary process for log(z). A
value of 0.9919 is used (this is the estimate obtained under subsample 1959.I-1983.IV).
This is not a problem given that the volatility of the business cycle does not depend
critically on ½1.
15Table 10: M s.e(acyc) for a = (y;c;i;b;n): O¾", O¾º and no credit constraint
¾(ycyc) ¾(ccyc) ¾(icyc) ¾(bcyc) ¾(ncyc) ¾(TFPcyc)
59-83 1.6726 0.7347 3.4336 3.0461 0.9712 1.1500
84-99 0.8359 0.3672 1.6901 2.0061 0.4861 0.5745
O% ¡50:02% ¡50:02% ¡50:78% ¡34:14% ¡49:95% ¡50:03%
Table 11: M s.e(acyc) for a = (y;c;i;b;n): O¾", O¾º and and binding credit constraint
¾(ycyc) ¾(ccyc) ¾(icyc) ¾(bcyc) ¾(ncyc) ¾(TFPcyc)
59-83 1.5139 0.6978 3.3205 2.3288 0.8483 1.0551
84-99 0.7592 0.3497 1.6388 1.6824 0.4256 0.5290
O% ¡49:85% ¡49:85% ¡50:65% ¡27:76% ¡49:83% ¡49:86%
(c), investment (i), credit (b), employment (n) and TFP of the whole economy.
The previous tables show that, in this arti¯cial economy, business cycle volatility of
the main macro aggregates (including total TFP) is approximately 50% lower under the
second set simulations (i.e. during the 1984 ¡ 1999 period). This result is compatible
with the facts documented by Arias, Hansen and Ohanian (2002) for the U.S. economy.
Interestingly, with a binding credit constraint the volatility of the cyclical component
of each macroeconomic variable is lower than in the absence of a credit constraint. This
means that, in terms of cyclical volatility levels, the restriction to movement associated
to the constraint itself dominates the ampli¯cation and propagation mechanisms of
the underlying ¯nancial accelerator. Note also that, when there is a binding credit
constraint, the observed volatility reduction in the cycle of the main macro aggregates
is marginally or insigni¯cantly lower than under the unconstrained case. The behavior
of the cyclical volatility of credit is the only exception. Its volatility reduction under the
binding credit constraint scenario is 7 percentage points lower than under the ¯nancially
frictionless environment. In any case, the important point is that introducing a credit
constraint into the model does not impede it from replicating the 50% volatility fall in
the business cycle.
To isolate that part of the total fall in business cycle volatility attributable only to
the fall in the volatility of the banking productivity shock (i.e. to the fall in ¾À), the
same process is repeated with some di®erences. As above, in a ¯rst set of simulations
(i.e. the one that represents 1959 ¡ 1983) estimates of (½0;½1;¾";'0;'1;¾À) for the
1959:I ¡ 1983:IV subsample are employed. In a second set of simulations (i.e. the
one that represents 1984 ¡ 1999) estimates of (½0;½1;¾") for the 1959:I ¡ 1983:IV
16Table 12: M s.e(acyc) for a = (y;c;i;b;n): O¾º only and no credit constraint
¾(ycyc) ¾(ccyc) ¾(icyc) ¾(bcyc) ¾(ncyc) ¾(TFPcyc)
59-83 1.6726 0.7347 3.4336 3.0461 0.9712 1.1500
84-99 1.5878 0.6872 3.2888 2.4264 0.9192 1.0936
O% ¡5:07% ¡6:47% ¡4:22% ¡20:34% ¡5:35% ¡4:90%
Table 13: M s.e(acyc) for a = (y;c;i;b;n): O¾" only and no credit constraint
¾(ycyc) ¾(ccyc) ¾(icyc) ¾(bcyc) ¾(ncyc) ¾(TFPcyc)
59-83 1.6726 0.7347 3.4336 3.0461 0.9712 1.1500
84-99 0.8569 0.3716 1.7442 2.5437 0.5056 0.5855
O% ¡48:76% ¡49:42% ¡49:20% ¡16:49% ¡47:94% ¡49:09%
subsample are maintained while estimates of ('0;'1;¾À) for the 1984:I ¡ 1999:IV
subsample are used. Then, in a third set of simulations estimates of ('0;'1;¾À) for
the 1959:I ¡ 1983:IV subsample are maintained while estimates of (½0;½1;¾") for the
1984:I ¡ 1999:IV subsample are used. These three sets of simulations should isolate
the impact of the fall in ¾À over the total fall in business cycle volatility. The following
tables report the resulting business cycle statistics for the three sets of simulations
under the unconstrained and the binding credit constraint environments.
Consider ¯rst the results from the unconstrained model (the ¯rst two tables). The
results show that the fall in the volatility of the banking productivity shock alone
contributes, at most, with 5 to 6 percentage points (out of 50) to the observed total
fall in the volatility of the business cycle. The only exception is the fall in the volatility
of the credit cycle (20 percentage point fall). Note that the results also show that
the fall in the volatility of the non-¯nancial productivity shock alone generates a 48
to 49 percentage point fall in the volatility of the overall business cycle (out of 50).
Table 14: M s.e(acyc) for a = (y;c;i;b;n): O¾º only and binding credit constraint
¾(ycyc) ¾(ccyc) ¾(icyc) ¾(bcyc) ¾(ncyc) ¾(TFPcyc)
59-83 1.5139 0.6978 3.3205 2.3288 0.8483 1.0551
84-99 1.4338 0.6523 3.1711 1.7153 0.7999 1.0013
O% ¡5:29% ¡6:52% ¡4:50% ¡26:34% ¡5:71% ¡5:10%
17Table 15: M s.e(acyc) for a = (y;c;i;b;n): O¾" only and binding credit constraint
¾(ycyc) ¾(ccyc) ¾(icyc) ¾(bcyc) ¾(ncyc) ¾(TFPcyc)
59-83 1.5139 0.6978 3.3205 2.3288 0.8483 1.0551
84-99 0.7815 0.3548 1.7000 2.1897 0.4460 0.5408
O% ¡48:38% ¡49:15% ¡48:80% ¡5:97% ¡47:42% ¡48:74%
The only exception, again, is the volatility of the credit cycle (only a 16.5% volatility
reduction).
Do these results change when there is a credit constraint that binds (the last two
tables)? Only in the sense that the contribution of the fall in ¾À to the fall in the volatil-
ity of the credit cycle goes up (from 20 to 26 percentage points) while the contribution
of the fall in ¾" goes down (from 16.5 to 6 percentage points).
After taking all this into consideration it can be said that, with or without a binding
credit constraint (and, hence, ¯nancial acceleration), the contribution of the fall in the
volatility of the banking productivity shock to the overall fall in the volatility of the
U.S. business cycle seems to be minimal: between 2 and 5 percentage points out of 50.
All the action seems to come from the reduction in the volatility of the non-¯nancial
productivity shock. Only the volatility of the credit cycle is impacted signi¯cantly by
the volatility fall of the banking productivity shock. This impact is enhanced when the
¯nancial accelerator mechanism is activated.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper was to answer the following two questions. First, is the mid-
80's fall in the cyclical volatility of U.S. commercial banking productivity a potential
candidate to account for the mid-80's fall in U.S. business cycle volatility? Second, does
the answer to the previous question change under the presence of ¯nancial frictions?
The answer to the ¯rst question is that the fall in the cyclical volatility of banking
productivity contributes signi¯cantly only to the volatility fall of the credit cycle. For
the other macroeconomic aggregates, the contribution lies between 2 and 5 percentage
points of volatility reduction (out of 50). The answer to the second question is that
allowing for ¯nancial acceleration does not change the previous results signi¯cantly if
parameter values still replicate basic, empirical, macroeconomic regularities observed
in the US during the 1959 ¡ 1999 period. According to the results, ¯nancial acceler-
ation only augments the contribution of the fall in the cyclical volatility of banking
productivity to the credit cycle volatility fall.
This paper gives some perspective to the role played by the ¯nancial sector (and
18monetary policy?) during the mid-80's U.S. business cycle volatility fall. According to
this paper, if it played a role it was not a leading role. As Arias, Hansen and Ohanian
(2002) suggested, it seems that the leading role was played by the behavior of the
economy's overall productivity. This paper also adds to the ¯ndings of Kocherlakota
(2000), Cole and Ohanian (2001), Chakraborty and Lahiri (2001) and Arias (2002)
which question the quantitative signi¯cance of the e®ects of ¯nancial frictions over
the level of economic activity. Indeed, this paper raises doubt on the quantitative
signi¯cance of the e®ect of frictions in ¯nancial markets over the volatility of economic
activity.
In the early 80's the U.S. banking industry went through a major deregulatory
process. The Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act of 1980
and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 were the main components of this process. The
phasing out of regulation Q, which began in 1980, was ¯nally achieved in 1986. Is the
mid 80's fall in the cyclical volatility of U.S. commercial banking productivity a result
of this deregulatory process? If so, the results of this paper suggest that these deregu-
latory acts might have contributed signi¯cantly to the fall in the volatility of the credit
cycle (but not to the fall in the volatility of the main macroeconomic aggregates). On
the other hand, the results of this paper also suggest that the discovery of a signi¯cant
link between banking deregulation, banking productivity and macroeconomic volatility
requires the use of more stylized models than the ones we have at hand today. Never-
theless, the link between banking regulation and macroeconomic behavior is certainly
an interesting avenue for future research.
7 CALIBRATION APPENDIX
Parameter values were chosen so that the model, in stationary state, mimics some
long-run empirical regularities observed in the U.S. Speci¯cally, the parameters were
calibrated to a quarterly frequency using U.S. data for the period 1959-1999.
7.1 No Credit Constraint
The following system of equations characterizes the steady state variables of the no-
constraint economy relative to output (recall l = 1):
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Suppose that the credit constraint binds. The following system of equations charac-
terizes the steady state variables of the credit constrained economy relative to output
(recall l = 1).
7.3 Data to Measure £ and £0
To construct the empirical counterparts of £ and £0 the following U.S. data was used:
For y, speci¯cally:
















Variable Description Source Original Units
Name Frequency
POP Total population, all ages (including armed forces overseas) 2 M Thousands
N Civilian Labor force (16 yrs and older) 7 M Percent
n2 Commercial Bank employees (all employees) 7 M Percent
rT (1) Three month certi¯cate of deposit (cod) interest rate 5 M* Percent
rT (2) National monthly cost of funds ratio to SAIF-insured institutions 6 M Percent
bcr Commercial and industrial loans at all commercial banks 4 M BD
bTOT Total loans and investment at all commercial banks 4 M BD
dTOT Total checkable deposits plus total time deposits at commercial banks 3 M BD
dT Total time deposits at commercial banks 3 M BD
kP Current cost, net stock of private total ¯xed assets located
at US that are owned by private business or nonpro¯t institutions 1 A BD
KG Current cost, net stock of government's total ¯xed assets 1 A BD
KD Current Cost, net stock of consumer durable goods 1 A BD
cND Personal consumption expenditures in non-durable goods 1 Q BD
cS Personal consumption expenditures in services 1 Q BD
CG Government consumption expenditures 1 Q BD
iP Gross private domestic investment 1 Q BD
iG Government gross domestic expenditures 1 Q BD
iD Personal consumption expenditures in durable goods 1 Q BD
NX Net exports 1 Q BD
GNP Gross National Product 1 Q BD
Corporate Pro¯ts Corporate pro¯ts with capital consumption
adjustment and inventory valuation adjustment 1 Q BD
Net interest Net interest 1 Q BD
Proprietor/s income Proprietor's income with capital consumption
adjustment and inventory valuation adjustment 1 Q BD
NNP Net national Product 1 Q BD
National income National income 1 Q BD
Depreciation Consumption of ¯xed capital 1 Q BD
Rental income Rental income of persons with capital consumption adjustment 1 Q BD
Price index GNP chain-type price index 1 Q 1996=100
M: Monthly; Q:Quarterly; A: Annual; BD; Billion of Dollars; ¤: Average of Business Days.
Sources:
1. U.S. Dept of commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
2. U.S. Dept of commerce, Census Bureau
3. H.6 Release Federal Reserve Board of Governors
4. H.8 Release Federal Reserve Board of Governors
5. H.15 Release Federal Reserve Board of Governors









bTOT ) k = kp + kG + dD
c = cND + cS + cG i = iP + iG + iD + NX





G = (1 ¡ ±G)kG + iG













yG = (r + ±G)kG[¤¤] yD = (r + ±D)kD[¤¤¤]
y = GNP + yG + yD + (1 + R)d
22The average (as opposed to each observation) of [rT(2) ¤ (dT=dTOT)] is used to
construct y because data for such series is only available since 1964. If each observation
of [rT(2) ¤ (dT=dTOT)] is used to construct y then all the information of the other
variables (i.e. GNP, yG and yD) prior to 1964 would be lost.
The measurement of the di®erent elements of £ and £0 (which determine ª and































































where yp, yG, yD and y are de¯ned and constructed according to (*), (**), (***)
and (****).
238 SHOCK IDENTIFICATION APPENDIX
From (6)-(8) this equation implies with n2 = n¡n1 this equation implies, rearranging::
°n = [° + (1 ¡ µ)Á]n1
This, in turn, implies:
n1 = ­n (1sid)




[° + (1 ¡ µ)Á]
Now recall the de¯nition of per-capita ¯nal good output, using (1sid) in per-capita













From (2sid) ¯nal good total output is given by:









where N stands for the total number of workers, H represents total work hours
supplied by households and k and L the total stock of capital and land. Let e be (zxÁ)
or the composite shock, representing TFP at the aggregate level. Given that A1 is a
constant and that K and L are pretty stable across time, equation (3sid) shows that e




24or, if D is also su±ciently stable across time, then there is no need for data on




The latter way of measuring e is the standard way of measuring aggregate TFP.
Now recall the de¯nition of per-capita banking output, using (1sid) the per-capita





A2 = (1 ¡ ­)
1¡µ
From (5sid) total banking output is given by:
B = bN = A2xD
µH
1¡µ (6sid)
where H represents total work hours supplied by households. Given that A2 is a




or, if D is su±ciently stable across time, then there is no need for data on deposits
















U.S. quarterly data and equations (4sid), (7sid) and (8sid) [or, alternatively, equa-
tions (4sid'), (7sid') and (8sid) if no deposit data is to be employed] were used to
construct e, x and z, respectively. Note that the construction of z is not sensitive to
deposit data.
25Table 22: Shock identi¯cation appendix variables
Variable Description Source Original Units
Name Frecuency
Y Seasonally adjusted annual rates 1 Q Billions of
chained
1996 USD
H Total annual hours in the private 2 Q Billions of
non-farm sector (Seasonally adjusted) Hours
D Total checkable deposits plus total 3 Q¤ Billions of
time deposits at commercial banks, chained
de°ated by the GNP-chain-type price 1996 USD
index (Seasonally adjusted stocks)
B Commercial and industrial loans at 4 Q¤ Billions of
all commercial banks de°ated by the chained
GNP-chain-type price index 1996 USD
(Seasonally adjusted stocks)
Q¤:Quarterly average of monthly values.
Sources:
1. U.S. Dept of commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
2. Establishment survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics
3. H.6 Release Federal Reserve Board of Governors
4. H.8 Release Federal Reserve Board of Governors
The values of Á, µ and ° used for the construction of e, x and z were those resulting
from the calibration of the model under no credit constraints (the calibrated values
of µ and ° do not depend on whether there is a constraint or not but the value of
Á does). Note also that the construction of e; x and z uses optimality conditions
for the unconstrained environment. In fact, if there is a binding credit constraint
°
y
n1 = (1 ¡ µ)Á
y
n2 does not hold. Instead: °
y
n1 < (1 ¡ µ)Á
y
n2. This does not allow
equation (1sid) to hold. However, an expression similar to (1sid) can be found where
­ is not a constant but equal to °y=[(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ »)(ql + (1 ¡ ±)k) + °y]. If K, q and
L are stable across time, the construction of e; x and z under no credit constraints
should also apply for the binding credit constraint case.
The following list describes the data used to construct e; x and z:
Next, the stochastic processes governing log(e), log(x) and log(z) were estimated:
26Table 23:
b ½0 b ½1 b ½"
With deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) 0.0153 0.9981 0.0069
Without deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) 0.0158 0.9980 0.0073
c '0 c '1 c 'º
With deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) -0.0262 0.9728 0.0160
Without deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) 0.0475 0.9934 0.0191
c ¼0 c ¼1 b ¾
With deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) 0.0193 0.9973 0.0067
Without deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) 0.0206 0.9974 0.0073
¾b "b º
¾b º
¾b " b ¾"
With deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) 4:7x10¡5 2.3262 2.3998
Without deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) 5:3x10¡5 2.6120 2.6123
log(zt+1) = ½0 + ½1 log(zt) + "t+1; "t v N(0;¾
2
")
log(xt+1) = '0 + '1 log(xt) + Àt+1; Àt v N(0;¾
2
À)
log(et+1) = ¼0 + ¼1 log(et) + ²t+1; ²t v N(0;¾
2)
The estimates of the parameters in the AR(1) processes governing log(e), log(x) and
log(z) depend on whether data for deposits is used or not [i.e. on whether equations
(4sid), (7sid) and (8sid) or (4sid'), (7sid') and (8sid) are used to construct e, x and z].
The resulting estimates are:
9 SOLUTION APPENDIX
Once the parameters of the model (¯; ±; ®; °; Á; µ; h; g; ´; R) are calibrated and once
the parameters of the stochastic processes governing log(z) and log(x) (½0; ½1; ¾"; '0;
'1; ¾À; ¾"À) are estimated, the recursive competitive equilibrium is solved with the
linear-quadratic method (see Cooley and Hansen 1995 or Ljunqvist and Sargent 2000,
chapter 4).
The following tables provide a check on the accuracy and robustness of the solu-
tion method. The ¯rst line presents the values of the model's main macroeconomic
aggregates under its non-stochastic, stationary version (SS) which, recall, replicates
U.S. data averages for the period 1959 ¡ 1999 (independently of whether there is a
binding credit constraint or no constraint at all). Lines two and three show, for the
27Table 24:
c/y i/y d/y k/y n n1 n2
SS 0.5914 0.3422 0.0661 10.1740 0.9399 0.9299 0.0100
RULE SS 0.5914 0.3422 0.0661 10.1740 0.9399 0.9299 0.0100
RULE SScc 0.5918 0.3420 0.0659 10.1662 0.9402 0.9292 0.0110
SIM SS 0.5935 0.3404 0.0658 10.1174 0.9401 0.9301 0.0100
SIM SScc 0.5938 0.3404 0.0655 10.1038 0.9406 0.9296 0.0110
Table 25:
labor land capital deposit
share share share share
SS 0.5394 0.0130 0.3811 0.0664
RULE SS 0.5394 0.0130 0.3811 0.0664
RULE SScc 0.5400 0.0131 0.3813 0.0662
SIM SS 0.5390 0.0130 0.3809 0.0661
SIM SScc 0.5396 0.0132 0.3814 0.0658
same aggregates, their non-stochastic, stationary values as inferred from the optimal,
linear decision rules under the no-constraint and binding credit constraint scenarios
(RuleSS and RuleSScc, respectively). The last two lines present, for the no-constraint
and binding credit constraint scenarios (Sim and Simcc, respectively), the aggregates'
means across 100 simulations of the economy of 264 periods (i.e. quarters) each. In
each simulation the initial state is set at its non-stochastic, stationary value. The ¯rst
100 periods of each simulation are discarded so that each simulation represents 41 years
(i.e. 1959-1999).
Prices yielded by the model depend on whether there is a binding credit constraint
or no constraint at all [see equations (7)-(10) and (7cc)-(10cc) and propositions 6 and
7]. The following table reports, for the model with no credit constraint, prices under
its non-stochastic, stationary version, prices in stationary state as inferred from the
optimal decision rules, and average prices across the simulations:
The following table reports, for the model with a binding credit constraint, prices
under its non-stochastic, stationary version, prices in stationary state as inferred from
the optimal decision rules, and average prices across the simulations:
It can be seen from the previous tables that the solution method is robust to the
analytical version of the model. Note that under both versions of the model the loan
rate (½) is unrealistically high (40%).
28Table 26:
w r s q ½
SS 1.8432 0.0375 0.0260 6.8680 0.3916
RULE SS 1.8432 0.0375 0.0260 6.8980 0.3916
SIM 1.8663 0.0377 0.0264 6.9212 0.4025
Table 27:
w r s q ½
SS 1.7289 0.0375 0.0244 6.4421 0.3845
RULE SScc 1.7292 0.0375 0.0245 6.3784 0.3740
SIMcc 1.7501 0.0378 0.0250 6.4243 0.3770
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